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ABSTRACT
The paper challenges the widespread assumption that the wage effects of
federal training programs are reliable and unbiased estimates of productivity
effects and social benefits. Evidence is presented that the reputations of
government training programs are unreliable and that employers stigmatize those
eligiblefor TJTC and CETA OJT contracts. Graduates of classroom training
programs which are known to be funded by JTP A are likely to be similarly
stigmatized. TJTC eligibles are seriously underpaid by employers and JTPA
graduates may experience a similar fate. Consequently, the true effects of
JTP A on the productivity of disadvantaged workers may be considerably larger
than its effects on wages. Methods of obtaining estimates of productivity
effects are described.
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TOWARD MORE VALID EVALUATIONS OF TRAINING PROGRAMS
SERVING THE DISADVANTAGED
By what criteria should the effectiveness of training programs be
evaluated? Among policy analysts there appears to be a consensus that these
programs should be judged by their ability to increase the earnings of
trainees. 1 If educators or employers were asked this question, however, they
would probably emphasize instead the training program's "ability to raise
the productivity of the trainees." Upon hearing this response policy analysts
might say "There is no disagreement. Conceptually productivity is the proper
social criterion. Earnings are simply the way of making productivity
operational. Estimates of wage effects (produced by a randomized experiment)
are unbiased estimates of productivity effects."2 But are the wage effects
of training initiatives serving the disadvantaged reliable estimators of their
productivity effects? Are they unbiased estimates of their productivity
effects? I conclude that the answer is no.
In benefit/cost analysis, it is conventional to assume that individuals
are paid wages (Wi) equal to their individual marginal revenue products (MRPi).
Yet this assumption is not an implication of modern economic theory. Implicit
contracts and signaling theories, for example, provide plausible models of
labor markets in which Wi ~ MRPi.
A simple way to test the Wi=MRP~ assumption is to collect data on the
productivity of workers at a particular firm who do the same job and are paid
the same hourly wage. If worker productivity varies substantially in most
samples, Wi=MRPi must be rejected. The industrial psychology literature
contains numerous studies of the variability of output across workers. Recent
1
2reviews of this literature have found that the ratio of the standard deviation
of yearly output to mean output, the coefficient of variation, averages about
14.4 percent for semi-skilled blue collar workers, about 16 percent for routine
clerical jobs, 28 percent in clerical jobs requiring some decision making
and about 35 percent for sales clerks.3 These studies have found that the
jobs paid on an hourly or weekly basis typically have larger coefficients
of variation than jobs paid on a piece rate basis4. With coefficients of
variation of this magnitude, it is quite clear that Wi=MRPi cannot be true
for most jobs.
Are the Reputations of Government Training Programs Reliable?
The assumption that individuals are paid their marginal revenue product
has been shown to be invalid. There is, however, another assumption -- wages
equal expected marginal revenue product -- which under some circumstances
can justify using wage effects of training as a measure of productivity
effects. Under this scenario employers do not know the productivity of
individual job applicants, but productivity becomes somewhat visible after
a worker has been hired. Wages only partially adjust to reflect the perceived
productivity differences between workers at the firm. Empirical evidence
suggests that after one year, the elasticity of relative wages to relative
productivity is .22 in very small firms and zero at establishments with more
than 400 employees.5 Wages do not adjust completely because workers are
risk averse6, because measures of job performance are unreliable?, because
productivity differentials are specific to the firm or only visible to the
firm8, because large differentials might reduce worker cooperation9 and because
performance rewards corne in the form of small permanent increments to one's
wage and not as an immediate bonus. Because follow-ups of the graduates of
3training programs seldom extend for more than a year or two, the long delays
before persistent performance differentials generate significant wage
differentials make evaluations of these programs particularly problematic.
According to this scenario, information on worker productivity does
influence the firm's future hiring decisions, however. If high school
graduates do a better job on average, then the employer gives hiring preference
to high school graduates. If a training program refers particularly capable
individuals, then the firm returns to that program for referrals. If referrals
from a training program are unsatisfactory, then it does not go back. This
scenario envisions employers sharing what they learn about particular training
programs with each other. Through this mechanism, training programs develop
local reputations that in turn influence the wage offers their graduates
receive. The graduates of programs with strong reputations are able to obtain
higher wage jobs. The graduates of programs with weak reputations have greater
difficulty finding work and typically end up in lower wage jobs.
The reputational mechanism should work reasonably well for visible
nonspecific educational achievements such as high school graduation or clerical
training in high school. The mechanism might also be expected to work
reasonably well when stable education and training programs cater to a limited
group of employers (eg., auto mechanics or beautician training) so that the
reputations that would develop would be reasonably reliable and competition
would force wage rates to reflect these reputations.
The reputational mechanism does not work well in a number of situations,
however. First, local labor markets for specific occupations are sometimes
monopsonistic or oligopsonistic (eg., training in health care occupations
in a city with only one or two hospitals). Customizing training for particular
4employers is becoming more popular and this often limits the number of firms
at which the training is useful. Under these circumstances training programs
produce skills that are to some degree firm specific and one would expect
wage effects of training to be smaller than productivity effects.
A second problem is that training programs generally disperse their
graduates widely. No single employer has enough contact with the graduates
of a specific program to draw a valid conclusion regarding the quality of
the training. Because there is no low cost mechanism for pooling the
experience of many different employers, reputations are created and evolve
very slowly.
A third problem is that many training programs are not stable. This
is especially true of the federally funded training initiatives such as
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA), Welfare Work Incentive (WIN),
Supported Work and Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) which have been the
subject of the majority of benefit-cost studies. These programs have had
very high staff turnover and have undergone frequent changes in design and
administration. The reputation developed under one administrative regime
may not be valid under another regime.
A fourth problem is that reputations can be manipulated by public
relations strategies and are often influenced by idiosyncratic events that
receive a lot of publicity. The more remarkable (ie., idiosyncratic) a story
is, the more likely it is to be picked up by the national press. The good
reputation of the Job Corps was enhanced by the pictures of George Forman
dancing around the boxing ring waving a small American flag after winning
the Olympic Gold Medal. The reputation of CETA was severely damaged by the
5national coverage given to a specific local work experience program that was
paying slum youth to play basketball.
Employers of unskilled workers devote few resources to hiring. For
retail, service and blue collar jobs, they review on average only 8
applications, interview only 4 applicants and invest a total of 7 hours in
the selection process. 10 The interview, the primary method for making
selections, has been found to have low reliability and low validity.11 Hiring
mistakes are frequent. It seems somewhat farfetched to assume that employers
who generally invest so little in their hiring selections have been motivated
to overcome the high costs of collecting and disseminating information about
local federally sponsored training programs. Increasing the number of trainees
studied does not solve this reliability problem, for employer beliefs about
the likely productivity of JTPA trainees are not arrived at independently.
The job and wage offers received by JTPA trainees are influenced by the general
reputation of CETA and JTPA and there are reasons for doubting the reliability
of these general reputations.
Not only are wage effects unreliable measures of the productivity effects
of federal training programs, they are probably biased as well. A systematic
bias results from the fact that participating in a program often informs
employers that the trainee is a member of a stigmatized target group and this
lowers employer perceptions of likely productivity. The next section of the
paper presents evidence that the groups targeted by these programs are indeed
stigmatized and that stigma generates systematic discrepancies between wage
rates and realized productivity.
GThe Effects of Stigma on Government Training and Job Creation Programs.
The idea that being on welfare is stigmatizing has been around for a
long time. Writing about direct relief recipients during the depression,
W. E. Bakke wrote:
Now he has made a public declaration of his failure, and no
rationalization can cover up the fact that a "reliefer" is not among
the roles his associates respect.12
Statistical proof that employer stigmatization of welfare recipients has major
consequences has been harder to come by. In seeking such proof one needs
to look for situations in which welfare recipient status is not confounded
with some other variable (eg. completion of a training program) that is likely
to affect either anticipated or real productivity. One also needs some way
of quantifying employer beliefs regarding welfare recipients. Conceptually
one wants to know the employer's willingness to pay to avoid hiring a welfare
recipient. The establishment of a tax credit for hiring welfare recipients
and other disadvantaged workers has created a number of opportunities for
examining this issue.
The most compelling evidence on the stigma issue comes from two separate
experiments conducted in 1980 in which welfare recipients were instructed
to inform employers of their eligibility for tax credits and wage subsidies
when they applied for a job. In both experiments the group that received
these instructions had a lower placement rate than other eligible welfare
recipients who had not. In the Dayton experiment, random assignment was used
to select the groups and the reduction in the placement rate was statistically
significant. 13
The results of the Racine/Eau Claire, Wisconsin quasi-experiment are
particularly interesting. The study compared WIN clients, who received
7placement services prior to the initiation of the experiment, to clients served
after the experiment began. Holding other characteristics constant, the WIN
clients who were instructed to tell employers about their eligibility for
a WIN tax credit were half as likely to obtain a job. This difference was
statistically significant at the 10 percent level. A follow-up of a small
subsample of experimentals and controls found that the WIN clients who followed
instructions and brought up their WIN tax credit eligibility when contacting
employers were one-third as likely to find a job. Of the thirty-two reporting
that they used the WIN tax credit as a marketing tool, only two (6 percent)
found jobs. Of the 26 reporting that they did not initiate discussion of
the WIN tax credit eligibility, five (19 percent) found jobs.14 This
difference is not statistically significant so it must be viewed as suggestive
only.
The results of these experiments suggest that when welfare recipients
announced their eligibility for a wage subsidy, prospective employers often
gained information that stigmatized the applicant. Apparently for some
employers, signaling one's welfare recipient status has such a powerful
stigmatizing effect that the perceived reduction in the job applicant's
expected productivity outweighs the prospect of a tax credit of up to $3,000
in the first year and $1,500 in the second year.
While welfare recipients are an important target group for JTPA services,
most JTPA trainees are not on welfare. Are the JTPA clients who are not on
welfare similarly stigmatized? Evidence that the disadvantaged in general -
- not just welfare recipients -- are stigmatized is provided by a 1982 survey
of 3000 employers regarding their use of and attitudes toward the Targeted
Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC). During 1981-82 the TJTC offered employers a tax credit
8equal to 50 percent of the first $6000 of wages paid to newly hired eligible
employees during their first year of employment and 25 percent of such wages
paid during the second year of employment. The eligible target groups were
handicapped individuals, welfare recipients and economically disadvantaged
youth, Vietnam veterans, and ex-offenders. In that survey all employers who
had heard of TJTC were asked if they thought "that tax-credit-eligible people
usually make better or poorer new employees than people who are not tax-credit
eligible.
"
Even though the socially acceptable response is probably "don't
know," "no difference," or "better," 28 percent of the respondents admitted
to believing they were poorer than average. Only seven percent said they
made better workers.
Further evidence of the important role of stigma comes from an examination
of the effect of the TJTC on the hiring standards and wage offers of
participating firms. Inducing employers to give hiring preference to TJTC
eligibles was an important goal of the program. It was anticipated that many
firms would be so attracted by the subsidy that they would be induced to lower
their hiring standards in order increase the number of TJTC hires. A silIlple
way of tracking the effect of TJTC on a firm's hiring standards is to compare
the wages and productivity of workers who were known to be TJTC eligible when
hired to the wages and productivity of others hired for the same job. If
TJTC causes firms to lower hiring standards, we would expect that for any
given starting wage rate, new hires who were known to be eligible when hired
would be less productive and require additional training.
If, however, being labeled as TJTC eligible is a bigger negative than
the tax credit is a positive, then we would expect wage offers to be reduced
or hiring standards (and therefore the productivity of the TJTC eligible new
9hires) to be increased. The third possibility is that knowledge of who is
TJTC eligible has no effect on hiring selections. This could occur if the
stigmatizing effect of TJTC eligibility counterbalances the perceived benefits
of the tax credit or if most firms are ignorant of the program or have no
tax liability. Once they are created by the hiring process, discrepancies
between productivity and wages can be expected to persist. As discussed
previously, worker risk aversion, errors in measuring job performance, and
the effective specificity of most productivity differentials between coworkers
makes it optimal for employment contracts to allow only small adjustments
of relative wage rates to differentials in perceived productivity.
A Model For Testing HyPotheses About Stigma
The profits exclusive of TJTC tax credit (Yi:!) generated by the lIillth
new hire for the IIjllth job are assumed to be equal to (Pi:!-Ti:!-Wi:!), the
productivity (Pi:!) net of training (Ti:!) and wage costs (Wi:!) of that hire.
Yij is a random variable which depends on the hiring standards and wage offers
that were in effect when lIillwas hired for job "j". Now let us compare the
profitability of two recent hires, person 1 and person 2, by constructing
a difference score, (Y~:!-Y2:!). Normally the expected value of the difference
would be zero. If, however, the firm lowers hiring standards or increases
wage offers in order to obtain workers who bring a subsidy to the firm, we
would expect (Y~:!-Y2j) to be positive when person 2, say, is TJTC eligible
and when person 1 is not eligible. On the other hand, if knowledge that an
applicant is TJTC eligible is so stigmatizing that it outweighs the attractions
of the tax credit, we would expect (Y~:!-Y2:!) to be negative when person 2
is TJTC eligible and person 1 is not eligible. The difference between the
10
profitability of two new hires for the same job can, thus, be represented
by the following equation:
Yl~ - Y2~ = B(Sl~-S2~) + 6(H1~-H2J) + U1J - U2J (1)
where Si~ = an indicator variable indicating whether person "i" was known
to be eligible for TJTC when hired. (Thirty-one percent
of the TJTC eligibles hired were not known to be eligible
when hired and they are coded as zero on this variable.)
Hi~ = a vector of control variables describing characteristics
of the new hire known at the time of hiring (eg. work
experience) and characteristics of the job such as hours
worked and its temporary versus permanent character.
uiJ = a random error that is specific to individual i.
I generated the sample of jobs for which paired data are available in
the following manner. A stratified random sample of employers was asked to
provide information on "the last new employee your company hired prior to
August 1981 regardless of whether that person is still employed by your
company." They were also asked to provide data on a second new hire in the
same or a very similar job but with contrasting amounts of vocational
education. This resulted in data on 659 pairs of individuals who have the
same or a very similar job at a particular establishment. (see Appendix A
for a fuller description of the sample) Missing data on specific questions
further reduces the sample. Seventy percent of the establishments had fewer
than 50 employees and only 12 percent had more than 200.
The results of estimating equation 1 predicting the relative profitability
of two new hires are presented in Table 1. Appendix A contains a complete
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description of the construction of the dependent variable. Even though tax
credit receipts are not part of the ex post profitability construct, new hires
who were known to be eligible when hired turned out to be significantly more
profitable for the firm both during the first quarter of employment and about
a year later at the time of the interview (or separation if there is one).1S
The magnitude of the gains enjoyed by firms appears to have been about 16
percent of the average productivity or wages of a worker with two years of
tenure in the job. These results are consistent with the hypothesis of a
pervasive stigmatization of TJTC eligibles. The employers who knew about
TJTC eligibility prior to hiring (a) offered TJTC eligibles lower wage rates
on average or (b) ended up getting employees of better than average
productivity for that position. The stigma apparently caused employers to
become extremely careful in their selection of TJTC eligibles. This care
resulted in them hiring fewer eligibles but obtaining better employees than
anticipated when they did hire an eligible. It would appear that some of
the stigma of being TJTC eligible is not warranted.
The second line of the table presents an estimate of the effect of
receiving a CETA on-the-job training subsidy on the profitability of a new
hire. The coefficients on this variable are very close to zero implying that
stigma effects roughly canceled out the attraction of the subsidy. Since
firms must be familiar with the program to receive an on-the-job training
contract and subsidies are paid in cash, ineligibility for the subsidy and
ignorance of it cannot explain the lack of a negative coefficient. Stigma
does not, however, seem to completely outweigh the subsidy's attractions as
it does with TJTC.
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Because training costs must be recovered more rapidly in temporary
jobs, we would expect the measure of ex post profitability (which does not
include amortization of training costs) to be larger for temporary jobs.
This hypothesis is supported by the data. Hours worked per week appears to
be positively related to profitability probably because hours can be adjusted
upward when the new hire is discovered to be exceptionally competent.
Profitability during the first quarter is positively related to relevant work
experience and relevant vocational training and negatively related irrelevant
work experience. By the time of the interview, relevant vocational training
and irrelevant work experience no longer effects profitability and relevant
work experience has developed a negative relationship. The issues raised
by these results are left to another paper.
The Stigma Bias in Evaluations of Training Programs
It is very difficult to avoid stigmatizing the participants in training
programs that are targeted on the disadvantaged. As the National Academy
of Science's Committee on Youth Programs pointed out, "The problem is that
this very targeting tends to create an image of the programs as designed only
for 'failures;' both the programs themselves and their clientele become
stigmatized in the process".1E> Welfare recipients and low income youth respond
to this fact by not mentioning their backgrounds when they apply for a job.
Employers cannot ask job applicants whether they are on welfare or from a
low income family because of legal proscriptions. As a result, most employed
TJTC and JTPA eligibles are not known to be eligible by their employer. The
Congressional Budget Office estimated that less than 10 percent of the employed
disadvantaged youths eligible for TJTC had been claimed by their employers
in 1981. 17 When, however, disadvantaged youth complete a JTPA classroom
1o\J\.c
'1 ),
C'\,CIo"
l,JrlJ. .
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training program and seek employment, employers often learn of their
disadvantaged status through their association with JTPA. The knowledge that
the applicant is disadvantaged may hurt the individual's chances; the knowledge
that they have been trained helps their chances. If classroom training is
to benefit the trainee, the second effect must outweigh the first. If there
are earnings gains for the trainees, they will probably be small.
Table 2 illustrates how stigma might bias evaluations of training programs
serving the disadvantaged. The entries in this table are hypothetical employer
perceptions of how productivity depends on training and on whether an
individual is disadvantaged. Employers pay workers their expected productivity
so the table also describes the wages offered new hires who signal these
characteristics. The bottom row of the table is the average perceived
productivity of all workers in the occupation (20 percent of whom are
disadvantaged) and also the employer's wage offer if she does not know whether
the job applicant is disadvantaged. This is what the disadvantaged individuals
in the control group get paid. In this example, training raises productivity
by $2000, but when disadvantaged individuals are trained their wages rise
only $560 ($8000-$7440) because they become identified as disadvantaged by
virtue of their training.
What happens to the remaining $1440 of the productivity benefit of
training? That depends on whether the perceptions that disadvantaged workers
are less productive are correct. If these perceptions are wrong, then the
employer who hires the trainee receives the $1440 benefit because the firm
gets a better employee than expected. This is apparently what occurred with
TJTC. If the perceptions are correct on average (the disadvantaged individuals
are indeed less productive), the employer who would have hired the
14
disadvantaged individual if they had not been trained is the beneficiary.
That firm benefits because it avoids hiring an individual who is considerably
less productive than expected and who would have received more in compensation
than they contributed to the firm.
The conclusion is that training programs that have significant effects
on a worker's literacy, skills and productivity may, because of this labeling
effect, nevertheless, have very small effects on earnings. This may be the
reason why the Job Corps which has produced reading gains as great as 2.5
months (in grade level terms) for every month of instruction, nevertheless,
has very modest effects on employment and wages.~B
stigma may also help explain why comparison group studies have found
that the most intensive form of CETA training, classroom training, had only
modest effects on post-program earnings and why less intensive interventions
such as public service employment and on-the-job training contracts had much
more positive effects.19 It also helps explain why these studies find that
work ex~erience programs appear to have had the least favorable effect on
their participants.2o Community based organizations ran most work experience
programs and a major share of classroom training projects. When program
graduates sought unsubsidized jobs, prospective employers were able to tell
from the name of the previous employer or training provider that the individual
was disadvantaged. Being labeled in this way probably diminished the benefits
of the training and work experience. Not all CETA trainees were publicly
labeled, however. In the public service employment program and the on-the-
job training contract program, sponsoring employers knew that the trainee
was a CETA client but the later employers of these trainees generally did
not. When these trainees completed their period of subsidized employment
15
and sought unsubsidized employment, their job experience at XYZ corporation
or ABC agency served as a positive signal that gave no hint of their
association with CETA.
The tendency of CETA participants in public service employment and on-
the-job training to do better than work experience and classroom training
participants is also a consequence of the mechanisms by which clients are
recruited into these activities. The employers who participated in the public
service and on-the-job training programs selected from among CETA eligibles.
When private employers did not perceive the CETA referrals to be qualified,
they hired an unsubsidized employee instead.21 Many of the CETA clients who
were sent out to interview at potential contract employers were never offered
a job and either drifted away from CETA altogether or transferred to other
activities such as work experience and classroom training. (CUrrently in
the agencies participating in the JTPA experiment, only about one-third of
those initially sent in search of on-the-job training end up being formally
enrolled as an on-the-job training client.) The providers of work experience
and classroom training, on the other hand, were not generally able to pick
and choose among CETA eligibles. Clients were formally enrolled in CETA only
after they found a public service or work experience job or after beginning
a classroom training program. Clearly this mode of recruiting eligible
individuals into program activities causes selection bias in any evaluation
based on "treatment" comparisons. Selection effects probably cause estimates
of the effects of on-the-job training and public service treatments to be
positively biased and estimates of the effects of work experience and classroom
training to be negatively biased.
lG
stigma may also be the reason why, despite its very superficial nature,
job search training has been found in experimental studies to have such
positive effects on employment and earnings. Job clubs do not stigmatize
participants because potential employers are approached directly by the job
seeker, not by a job developer associated with a stigmatizing program. The
programs train job seekers in interview techniques (eg. dressing appropriately,
looking the employer in the eye when answering a question) which are designed
to create an impression of high productivity. They do not teach skills that
might actually increase productivity. If the productivity effects of job
search training were known, they would probably turn out to be smaller than
their earnings effects.
Local JTPA staff are quite aware of the labeling effect. They try to
overcome it by promising local employers to screen their clients carefully
and sending for interviews only those trainees who are able to handle the
job. Some programs have succeeded in building a positive reputation and others
have not.
Another way of forestalling stigma, and one that is recommended by the
Committee on Youth Programs, is to "mainstream" the disadvantaged into
institutions and activities that serve a cross section of the population.22
Financial aid programs such as Basic Educational Opportunity Grants and Work
study are successful in part because they avoid stigmatizing the students
they aid. A mainstream institution, however, risks its reputation when it
markets large numbers of disadvantaged workers to employers. A logical
response to this problem is for the agency to disperse disadvantaged trainees
across many institutions and fund them through performance based contracts.
By making the reward both generous and contingent on placement, JTPA can induce
17
mainstream institutions to make the accormnodations necessary for disadvantaged
trainees to succeed in training and obtain jobs.
How to Avoid Stigma Bias in Future Evaluations
Clearly, if one wants to know the effect of training on productivity,
one must ask those who supervise training program graduates (and control group
members as well) about productivity. The ex post descriptions of the
performance of specific named individuals are less likely to be distorted
by prejudice (because they refer to specific individuals) and are better
informed estimates of that individual's productivity than the starting wage
offer. But are such reports truly comparable across jobs and across firms?
Many dimensions of job performance (eg. absenteeism, tardiness, making
suggestions for improvements in the business, willingness to work overtime,
and responsiveness to training) are both concrete and comparable but global
assessments of productivity are not. Supervisors are unable to compare their
subordinates to similar employees in other firms. They are, however, able
to make valid comparisons between subordinates who have the same job
assignment, and they do this quite frequently.23 What is needed is a measure
of the discrepancy between an individual's productivity (net of required
training costs) and wage rate which can be combined with the more conventional
estimates of the earnings impacts of training.
The discrepancy between a worker's productivity and wage rate can be
decomposed into 3 elements:
Pij-Wij = (Pij-Pj) - (Wij-Wj) + (Pj-Wj) (2)
The first term is the worker's "relative productivity", the deviation of the
"i"th worker's marginal revenue product net of required training costs (Pij)
from the marginal revenue product net of required training costs (Pj) of the
18
average incumbent in the job at the firm. The second term is the worker's
"within-job relative wage", the deviation of an individual's wage from the
mean for that job at the firm. The last term is the difference between the
marginal revenue product net of required training costs of the average
incumbent in the job (P~) and the average wage for the job (W~). Direct
measurement of this last term is not feasible for it would require direct
measures of the marginal revenue product of work groups that are comparable
across jobs and across firms. Consequently, the effort to measure the
discrepancy between MRP and wage rates should focus on the first two terms
of equation 2.24 There will no doubt be errors in measurement but the
resulting estimate of the social benefits of training will be more valid than
the estimates that result from assuming that Pi~=Wi~.
The best way to obtain assessments of Pi~-P~ and Wi~-W~ is to ask the
supervisors of training program graduates to compare the trainee to two other
employees with the same or a very similar job assignment. The first comparison
would be against the most immediately senior employee (indicated by an s
subscript). The second comparison would be against the most immediately junior
employee (indicated by the r subscript). Data would be obtained on the tenure,
wage, costs of required training and a variety of background characteristics
of all three employees and on the productivity ratio for each of the two
comparisons. In order to measure the effect of JTPA on relative productivity
net of required training costs, similar data would be obtained for members
of a randomly assigned control group. Productivity wage discrepancy ratios
would be calculated from this data as follows:
DRis~ = A~[Pi~-P_~ - (Ti~-TB~)]/P~ - (Wi~-Ws~)/W~ (3)
DRir~ = A~[Pi~-Pr~ - (Ti~-Tr~)]/P~ - (Wi~-Wr~)/W~ (4)
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where i indexes the trainee or control group member and P~ and W~ are the
means for the three observations on workers in the job. A~ is a scaling factor
equal to the ratio of value added to compensation in some industries and to
one in others.2s By estimating models predicting these discrepancy ratios
as a function of tenure and trainee or control group status, we learn whether
the trainee's productivity net of training cost has risen more or less than
the wage differences between the two groups indicate.
If trainees' DR's are more positive than controls' DR's, the training
is yielding social benefits -- higher productivity -- that do not accrue to
the worker in higher wages, but instead go to employers, consumers, and other
workers. If productivity net of required training costs is measured on a
ratio scale and an assumption is made about A~, the relationship between the
average productivity and average wage of workers in the types of jobs occupied
by trainees and their controls, an estimate of total social benefits of JTPA
training may be obtained by combining the estimated mean DRs of the
experimental group (DRx) and the control group (DRc) with the mean earnings
of the two groups (Yx' Yc) in the following manner:
Social Benefit = (1 + DRx)Yx - (1 + DRc)Yc (5)
Studies of productivity effects need not be expensive. Eight hundred
phone interviews of supervisors split equally between treatment and control
groups would yield an estimate of the mean difference between experimental
and control group DR's with a standard error of .0242.26 Such a study would
have the power to detect very modest effects of training on relative
productivity.
How important is it to know the social benefits of training programs
like JTPA? It could be argued that the goal of JTPA is raising the earnings
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of its disadvantaged clients and that benefits or losses incurred by other
workers and employers should not be considered. This view is in error for
three reasons. First, everyone's utility should enter the social welfare
f~nction. The fact that a particular program's primary objective is to aid
the disadvantaged does not imply that the collateral benefits or costs
experienced by employers, consumers, and other workers should be ignored.
It only effects the weight to be attached to these effects.
Second, programs that are seen to benefit only a small and politically
powerless minority tend to receive low levels of funding. If solid evidence
were developed that employers, consumers, and other workers benefit from the
training of the disadvantaged, political support for the programs would
probably improve and program operators would find it easier to place trainees.
Employer satisfaction with trainees is a central evaluation criterion for
vocational education and this in part accounts for the political support that
many employers give this institution.
Finally, the exclusive focus on earnings and placement rates in
evaluations and in JTPA's performance standards tends to distort the management
of the programs. It tends to induce creaming of the eligible population.
It promotes the funding of short-term training in job search techniques that
does not identify the client as being JTPA eligible at the expense of longer
term training interventions that might increase a worker's productivity
significantly. It tends to make public relations and placement quotas rather
than high quality training the central focus of program management.
Summary and Caveats
I have challenged the widespread assumption that the wage effects of
federal training initiatives are reliable and unbiased estimates of
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productivity effects. This assumption has on occasion been justified by
assertion that individuals are paid their individual marginal revenue product.
This is clearly not true. studies of the productivity of workers doing the
same job and paid the same wage demonstrate that there is a great deal of
variability in worker output.
Another way of justifying the equation of wage effects with productivity
effects is to argue that wage offers reflect the reputation of individual
training programs and that these reputations offer reliable and unbiased
estimates of the value added of training. In order for this mechanism to
work, employers must know that the individual was trained, and what the average
effect of such training is on productivity at their work site. This assumption
is not realistic. Most employers contacted by a JTPA graduate have never
hired a graduate of that program before. Even where a few trainees have been
hired in the past, the small numbers hired and the changing nature of the
programs means that employers would not view this information as a reliable
basis for predicting the sucess of future graduates. Consequently, employers
incorporate reputational information gleaned from the mass media into their
assessments. Because reputations only imperfectly correspond to reality,
employer errors in assessing JTPA trainees are correlated. This implies that
even though larger sample sizes can significantly improve the reliability
of estimates of the wage effects of training, they may not substantially
improve the reliability of estimates of the productivity effects of training.
Wage effects are not just unreliable estimates of productivity effects,
they are biased as well. The people who participate in programs targeted
on the disadvantaged are often stigmatized by this very participation. Welfare
recipients and members of low income families who normally go incognito in
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the labor market often become publicly identified by their participation.
Because of this labeling effect, programs that substantially improve
productivity may nevertheless have only modest effects on wage rates.
Employers may end up benefiting as much from the training as the trainees.
Analysis of the effect of TJTC on the hiring standards of participating firms
supports the existence of a stigma bias.
Adding a few disclaimers to a study of the wage effects of training is
not a sufficient response to the problems that have been identified. The
wage numbers will get the attention; the disclaimers will be ignored. The
proper response is to allocate resources to measuring the productivity effects
of training when the analyst suspects the quality of training is not
efficiently signaled or membership in a stigmatized group is revealed by
training. studies of productivity effects would supplement not displace
studies of employment and wage effects.
I have argued that the standard practice of using the wage effects of
training as estimators of productivity effects often results in a biased
estimate of the social benefits of training. The paper has not shown that,
for JTPA as a whole, the bias is large or that there are not other biases
operating in the other direction. The magnitude of the bias is an empirical
question that depends on the nature of the local labor market and the specifics
of how the training program is administered and how trainees are marketed.
It can be settled only by conducting studies in which the productivity effects
are measured along with wage and employment effects.
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APPENDIX ON DATA AND MEASUREMENT ISSUES
I base my analysis on data from a survey of 3,412 employers sponsored
by the National Institute on Education (NIE) and the National Center for
Research in Vocational Education (NCRVE) conducted between February and June
1982. The survey represents the second wave of a two-wave longitudinal survey
of employers from selected geographic areas across the country.
The first wave was funded by the u.s. Department of Labor to collect
data on area labor market effects of the Employment Opportunity Pilot Projects
(EOPP) . The survey encompassed 10 EOPP pilot sites and 18 comparison sites
selected for their similarity to the pilot sites. The survey design specified
a strategy of over sampling firms with a relatively high proportion of low-
wage workers.
The second wave attempted to interview all of the respondents in the
first-wave survey. About 70 percent of the original respondents completed
surveys for the second wave. In the bulk of the sample, respondents were
the owners/managers of the establishments. In large organizations the primary
respondent was the person in charge of hiring, generally the personnel officer.
When primary respondents were unable to answer a question, they were asked
if someone else in the organization would have the information, and that part
of the interview was completed with this other official. Other respondents
included comptrollers, wage and salary administrators, and line supervisors
(for questions about a particular recent hire). Most of the respondents were
the owner/manager of small firms who were quite familiar with the performance
of each of the firm's employees. Seventy percent of the establishments had
fewer than 50 employees, and only 12 percent had more than 200 employees.
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I analyze data from a subsample of employers who gave information on
two different recent hires for the same or a very similar job. The 3,412
employers who received the full questionnaire were asked to select "the last
new employee your company hired prior to August 1981 regardless of whether
that person is still employed by your company." The employers that provided
information on one new hire were asked to provide data on a second new hire
in the same or a very similar job but with contrasting amounts of vocational
education. Of the 2,594 employers who provided data on one new hire, 1,511
had not hired anyone else in that job in the last two years, and 424 had not
hired anyone with a different amount of vocational training for that position
in the last two years. As a result, data are available for 659 pairs of
individuals who have the same job at the same establishment. Missing data
on specific questions used in the model further reduced the sample sizes to
534 in one model and 454 in another.
Each employer surveyed was asked about the training provided to the two
new employees, current and starting hourly wage rates and an average wage
rate paid to workers with two years of experience, and the productivity of
new hires at various points in their tenure. A copy of the relevant portions
of the questionnaire can be obtained from the author.
The survey asked the employer (or in larger firms the immediate
supervisor) to report on productivity of the typical individual hired in the
job after two weeks, during the next 11 weeks and at the end of two years
at the firm. The supervisor was asked to do the rating on a "scale of zero
to 100 where 100 equals the maximum productivity rating any of your employees
in (NAME'S) position can obtain and zero is absolutely no productivity by
your employee." For the full data set at the mean values of these indexes
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0t reported productivity were 49.0 for the first two weeks, 64.6 for the next
:1 ~8ekb and 81.4 at the Lime of the interview. The questions asking for
L1 ra:~irjg of Hie proouctivity of particular workers have remarkably low
nonresponse rates (see end note 24).
'J'heinterview questions about the productivity of recently hired employees
do not measure productivity in any absolute sense and therefore are not
comparable across firms or across jobs in a firm. Rather, they are intended
as ratio scale indicators of the relative productivity of workers who do the
same job at a firm. Under an assumption that these productivity indexes are
proportional transformations of true productivity plus a random error,
percentage differences in cell means of the productivity index will be unbiased
estimators of percentage differences in true productivity. If the variations
in the productivity scores assigned by supervisors exaggerate the proportionate
variations in the true productivity, our estimates of percentage differences
in productivity between two workers will be biased upward. Even though it
is possible for a worker's true productivity to be negative, the scale was
defined as having a lower limit of zero. Floors and ceilings on a scale
typically cause measurement errors to be negatively correlated with the true
value. If this is the case, then our estimates of percentage differences
in productivity between two workers will be biased downward. This latter
type of bias appears to be more likely than the former.
Further evidence that the proportionality assumption results in an
understatement of percentage differences in productivity between individual
workers doing the same job comes from comparing the coefficients of variation
of productivity in this and other data sets. If pairs of workers who are
still at the firm are used to construct a coefficient of variation for this
2/
data set, it averages .13 for sales clerks, clerical, service and semi-skilled
blue collar workers. This estimate of the coefficients of variation is smaller
than the estimates of the coefficients of variation for yearly output derived
from analysis of objective ratio scale measures of output. These estimates
were .35 for sales clerks, .144 for semi-skilled blue collar workers and .16
for workers in routine clerical jobs27. This means that the estimates of
the effect of stigma on productivity and profitability reported in this paper
are probably conservative. The fact that the employer is reporting on the
past productivity of particular employees may also generate biases in data
but it is not clear how the stigma results might be influenced by this bias.
Data were obtained on the amount of time that is devoted to training
each of the two new hires during their first three months. Separate questions
were asked about training hours spent in formal training, informal training
by management and informal training by co-workers. For the sample of firms
and jobs, the means for the typical worker was 10.7 hours for formal training
programs, 51 hours for informal training by management, 24.2 hours for informal
training by co-workers.
A training time index was constructed by first valuing trainer and trainee
time relative to that of workers with two years of tenure in that job and
then combining the time invested in training activities during the first three
months on the job. The opportunity costs of the time of management staff
members who provided formal and informal training were assumed to be 1.5 times
the opportunity cost of the time of co-workers providing such training. Based
on the mean values of the productivity index the trainee's time was valued
at 80 percent of the opportunity cost of an experienced coworker's time.
When supervisors and coworkers are giving informal training to a new employee,
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the trainee is almost invariably involved directly in a production activity.
Employers report that for informal training, the trainees are typically as
productive while being trained as they are when working alone.2B Consequently,
informal training time is assumed to involve only the investment of the
trainer's time. The training time index is equal to 0.8 times the hours spent
watching others do the job plus 1.8 times the hours in formal training plus
1.5 times the hours in training by management plus hours in training by co-
workers. 29 The arithmetic mean of this index is 147.2 hours, implying that
the value of the time invested in training a typical new employee in the first
three months is about 28.3 percent of the output that a co-worker would produce
in three months.
I obtain estimates of the ex-post profitability of new hire number 1
and new hire number 2 by combining th~ data on their wages, productivity and
training costs. Because data is not available on costs of training beyond
the first three months at the firm, the ex--post profitability variable for
the date of the interview or separation is based solely on a comparison of
the productivity and wage rate differentials between the two new hires:
YC~~-YC2~ = [(PC~~-pC2~)/pT~) - In(WC~~/WC2~) (la)
The formula for the differential in ex-post profitability during the first
three months is:
yS~~_yB2~ = [(PS~~_.pS2~)/pT~) - [(TS~~-TS2~)/520) - [(WS~~-WB2~)/WT~) (2a)
where
ySi~' YCij = Profitability excluding tax credit of the "inth new hire
in job "j" during the first three months (8) and at the time
of the interview or separation (C).
pSi~' pCi~ = Productivity index for person "i" during the first 3 months
(S) and at the time of the interview or separation (C).
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WSij, WCij =: Wage of person "i" at the start (8) and at the time of the
interview or separation (C).
pTj, WTj
= Productivity index and wage of the typical worker in job
"j" with two years of tenure.
TSij = Opport~nity costs during the first three months of training
person "i". The units of the training index are hours of
time of a worker with two years of tenure in job "j".
Note that by dividing by PTj, the productivity differential, (pS1j-pB2j),
is translated into the metric of the productivity expected from a worker with
two years of tenure in job "j". This is also the metric of the training cost
differential so the two terms may be summed. The starting wage differential,
(WS1j-WS2j), is divided by the wage of a typical worker with two years of
tenure in the job. The profitability proxy is constucted under an assumption
that pTj = WTj' This implies that the third term need not be multiplied by
an adjustment factor before being subtracted from the terms describing
productivity and training differentials. Because TJTC eligibles known to
be eligible when hired are simultaneously paid less and tend to produce more,
other assumptions regarding the relationship between pTj and WTj (such as
pTj
= 1.4WTj) do not appreciably change the statistical significance of the
tests of the hypothesis that coefficient B in equation (1) is greater than
zero.
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Footnotes
1. The 495 page report of the National Academy of Science's Committee on Youth
Employment Programs, for example, focuses primarily on employment and
earnings outcomes. It discusses effects of youth programs on crime and
welfare dependence but nowhere discusses the possibility that the effects
of training on productivity might be different from its effects on earnings
Charles L. Betsey, Robinson G. Hollister, Jr., and Mary R. Papageorgiou,
(eds.) Youth Employment and Training Programs: The YEDPA Years, National
Academy Press. Washington, DC, 1985..
2. When value of output benefits are being estimated standard practice calls
for adding fringe benefits, unemployment insurance taxes and the employer's
share of social security taxes to gross earnings. Plans for the JTPA
experiment include a benefit-costs analysis for which "the largest item
from society's perspective is increased post program earnings."
Abt./MDRC/NOC4.RC/ICF. Design of the JTPA Experiment and the Selection
and Nonexperirnental Evaluation Studies (DRAFT). Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, October 14,
1986. The exhibit accompanying this text refers to this item as "value
of increased post program output" (p. VI-42). Here again there is no
discussion in the text of the possibility that wage effects and productivity
effects might be different. A few of the classic references in the field
were examined to see whether a possibility of productivity effects differing
from wage effects was entertained. It does not corne up in Edward Gramlich's
Benefit-Cost Analysis of Government Programs, (Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood
Cliffs, NJ; 1981) but it is mentioned in other references. In a long list
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of potential benefits Borus includes, "The increase in average output per
hour worked in firms which hire program participants," Mi.Ghael Borus,
Measuring the Impact of Employment-Related Social Programs, W.E. Upjohn
Institute for Employment, pg. 26. In a list of potential negative effects
of manpower programs Cain and Hollister mention, "Programs placing the
hard-core poor into jobs have had, according to some reports, disruptive
effects on the plant -- both because of the behavior of the trainee-
participants (e.g., disciplinary problems and high rates of absenteeism)
and because of the special treatment which the participants received" Glen
Cain and Robinson Hollister. "The Methodology of Evaluating Social Action
Programs." Evaluating Social Programs, edited by Peter Rossi and Walter
Williams; Seminar Press; New York, 1972, pg. 129.
3. See John W. Boudreau, "utility Analysis Applied to Human Resource
Productivity Improvement Programs." Forthcoming in the 2nd edition of
Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology, edited by M. D.
Dunnette. See John E. Hunter; Frank L. Schmidt and Michael K. Judiesch,
"Individual Differences in Output as a Function of Job Complexity," Michigan
State University and Department of Industrial Relations and Human Resources
University of Iowa, June, 1988.
4. See F. L. Schmidt and J. E. Hunter, "Individual Differences in
Productivity: An Empirical Test of Estimates Derived from Studies of
Selection Procedure utility." Journal of Applied Psychology, 68, 1973,
pg. 407-414.
5. See John Bishop. "Recognition and Reward of Employee Performance." Journal
of Labor Economics. ~, (1987), no. 4, pt. 2, 836-856.
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6. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Risk Sharing and Incentives in Sharecropping."
Review of Economic Studies, April 1974, 61, no. 2, pg. 219-256.
7. See M. Hashimoto and B. Yu, "Specific Capital, Employment and Wage
Ri.gidity." Journal of Economics, 11, no. 2, 1980: 536-549.
8. See John Bishop.
2E..:. c it .
9. See Edward Lazear, "Pay Equality and Industrial Politics." Working paper
in Economics No. E-86-12, The Hoover Institution, Stanford University,
April 1986.
10.See John Barron and John Bishop, "Extensive Search, Intensive Search and
Hiring Costs: New Evidence on Employer's Hiring Activity." Economic
Inquiry, July 1985.
11. See E. C. Mayfield, "The Selection Interview: A Reevaluation of Published
Research." Personnel Psychology, 1964, 17, pg. 239-260.
12.See W. E. Bakke, Citizens Without Work. (New Haven, Conn; Yale University
Press, 1940), p.255.
13.See Gary Burtless, "Are Targeted Wage Subsidies Harmful? Evidence from
a Wage Voucher Experiment." Industrial and Labor Relations Review, October
1985, Vol. 39, No.1, pg. 105-114.
14.See James Moran, et al., "Jobs Tax Credit - The Report of the Wage Bill
Subsidy Project, Phase II." Madison, Wisconsin Department of Health and
Social Services, January 1982.
15.Because controls were included for being a student when hired and for the
recruitment source of the new hire, these results are a TJTC effect and
not a cooperative education effect or the effect of a referral from the
employment service. Estimating the model without the large set of control
variables results in a larger and more significant coefficient on the
33
indicator for a knowingly hired TJTC eligible. There are 33 paired
comparisons in which one of the two new hires for the job was knowingly
hired as a TJTC eligible. Models were also estimated predicting turnover
and the individual components of the profitability index. '!'he new hires
who were known to be TJTC eligible received lower wage rates both initially
and after one year on the job and at some types of firms were significantly
more productive. Turnover and training costs were unaffected. See John
Bishop, Subsidizing On-the-Job Training of the Disadvantaged, W. E. Upjohn
Institute of Employment Research, Kalamazoo, Michigan, 1988.
16.Betsy, Hollister and Papageorgiou, 1985, op. cit.
17.See Sandra Christensen, The Targeted Jobs Tax Credit. Staff Memorandum.
Prepared at the request of the Committee on Ways and Means of the U. S.
House of Representatives. Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office,
May 1984.
18 See Barry Argento, Alternative Educational Models--preliminary Findings
of the Job Corps Educational Improvement Effort. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of Labor, 1981.
19. Employers report providing only 50 hours of training in the first month
of a job subsidized by an on-the-job training contract. John Bishop, "The
Social Payoff from Occupationally Specific Training: The Employer's Point
of View." Columbus, OH: The National Center for Research in Vocational
Education, The Ohio State University, 1982.
20.See Laurie J. Bassi, "The Effect of CETA on the Postprogram Earnings of
Participants." The Journal of Human Resources, Vol. XVIII, No.4, Fall
1983, and Burt Barnow, "The Impact of CETA Programs on Earnings.1I The
Journal of Human Resources. Vol. 22, No.2, Spring 1987, pp. 157-193.
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21.The 1980 EOPP employer survey provides evidence that employers did not
finally decide whether to participate in the CETA-OJT contract program
until they had assesed the candidates sent to them. The employers reported
that half of the job applicants interviewed for the positions that were
filled by a CETA trainee had not been referred by an agency or community
based organization.
22.See Betsey, Hollister and Papageorgiou, 1985,
~
cit.
23.Nearly all white collar workers appear to have their performance appraised.
See Martin E. personick, "White-Collar Pay Determination Under Range-of-
Rate Systems." Monthly Labor Review, December 1984, Vol. 6, pg. 25-30.
Supervisors who do not fill out a formal performance appraisal are
nevertheless accustomed to thinking along these lines. When a question
about the productivity (on a ratio scale) of particular new hires was asked
in the 1982 NCRVE employer survey, only 4.4 of respondents responded with
a donlt know or refused to answer. Comparably defined nonresponse rates
for other questions about the new hires were 8.2 percent for previous
relevant experience, 3.2 percent for age, 6.7 percent for schooling, 8.6
percent for time spent in informal training by supervisor and 5.7 percent
for the 3 question sequence from which starting wage was calculated. The
low non response rate implies that the employers felt that they were capable
of making such judgments. Such reports are known to contain a good deal
of error. In this application the productivity measures are dependent
variables, so no bias results if measurement error is not correlated with
the true P and all XIs.
24.This is not as serious a problem as might be imagined, because most of
the reasons for expecting P3 to be different from W3 at any time-- specific
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human capital, agency problems, and disequilibria -- imply that the present
discounted value of the difference Pj-Wj over the expected tenure of the
worker is zero. Theory suggests a number of factors which could cause
Pj-Wj to be non zero: adjustment costs, monopsony power, agency problems,
and specific human capital. If the firm were in disequilibrium due to
a cyclical downturn, the size of the quasi rents would vary across jobs
and their magnitude might be correlated with schooling, skills and JTPA
training. Specific human capital investments and monitoring costs may
also be different in the jobs obtained by JTPA trainees. In all three
cases, the time paths of productivity and wages that result have counter
balancing periods of over and under compensation. Consequently, from a
life cycle perspective, these quasi rents should net out to zero. Monopsony
power and bargaining with a union over the division of the firm's quasi
rents, on the other hand, might generate non zero lifetime Pj-Wj's. The
effect of queuing for union jobs on the social return to JTPA training
could be studied by modelling the effect of JTPA training on the likelihood
of getting a job that is covered by collective bargaining.
25.When a firm expands by hiring extra workers, it incurs significant fixed
costs. It must rent space, buy equipment, hire supervisors and recruit,
hire, and train the additional production workers and place them on the
payroll. If instead output can be increased by hiring more competent
workers, these additional costs can be avoided and the firm's capital
becomes more productive. These factors tend to magnify the effects of
work force quality on productivity. They imply that the ratio of the
standard deviation of worker productivity in dollars to average worker
compensation is much larger than the productivity CV for that job. See
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Foger Klein; Richard Spady, and Andrew Weiss, Factors Affecting the Output
and Quit Propensities of Production Workers. New York: Bell Laboratories
dnd Columbia University, 1983. See Robert Frank, "Are Workers Paid Their
Marginal Product." American Economic Review, Sept. 1984, Vol. 74:4, pg.
549-571. The value-added-to-compensation ratio is a reasonable estimate
of A~ for most industries, but it probably does not fit agriculture, mining,
real estate, wholesale and retail trade. In these industries it may be
best to assume Aj=l.
26.In a telephone interview format this question might be worded as follows:
"Now please think of the worker in this job who is most irnrnediately
senior to person i. When neither worker is involved in a training
activity, which worker is more productive? (person i or his/her more
senior coworker)?" [If the answer is "more" or "less" then ask) "In
percentage terms how much more [less) productive is he/she?" Questions
on training might be worded as follows: "During the past month, how
many hours did you or any other worker spend (away from other duties)
giving on-the-job training to person i?" The same question would be
asked about the immediately most senior and junior coworkers. One could
also ask retrospective questions about training and productivity during
the first month of employment. See Bishop 1987, op. cit. Assuming that
the CV of Pij is .2, the CV of Tij and Wij is 0, Aj=1.4 and the
Var[A(Pij-Pj-Tij+Tj)/Pj - (Wij-Wj)/Wj) = Var(Yij) = .0784, the Var[(DRiaj
+ DRirj)/2) = [Var(2Yij) + 2Var(Yij»)/4 =(.3136 + .1568)/4 = .1176.
When the sample is 800 and the population is equally divided between
controls and experimentals, the standard error for a difference of means
is 2(.1176)/400= .0242.
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27.Hunter, Schmidt and Judiesch, op. cit.
28 Kevin Hollenbeck and Bruce Smith. The Influence of Applicants' Education
and Skills on Employability Assessments by Employers. Columbus: The
National Center for Research in Vocational Education, The Ohio State
University, 1984.
29.The index was constructed under an assumption that the four training
activities were mutually exclusive. This implies that if the sum of the
hours devoted to individual activities is greater than 520, that a reporting
error has occurred which overstates investment of training. In the few
cases where the sum of hours devoted to training exceeded 520, the training
time index was adjusted downward by the ratio of 520 to the sum of the
hours reported for individual activities. This procedure reduces the mean
of the index by about 10 percent. The cost of the trainer was assumed
to be two-thirds of the foregone productivity, since formal training often
involves more than one trainee. Thus 1.8 = (2/3)1.5 + .8.
First Three Months
.157* ( 1.81)
.027 ( .34)
.013 (.25)
.092* (1.72)
.0060** (2.29)
-.013 (1.50)
.051* ( 1. 89 )
Table 1
Determinants of Differences in Profitability
Between Two New Hires
Known to be TJTC
Eligible When Hired
Subsidized by CETA-OJT
Contract
Student When Hired
Temporary Job
Hours Worked Per Week
Years of Education
Relevant Vocational Education
Relevant Experience
(less than one year)
Relevant Experience (years)
.040 (1.13)
(2.61)
( .94)
(3.19)
(2.75)
( 1. 10)
.0233***
Relevant Experienced Squared
Irrelevant Experience (years)
-.0028
-.014***
Irrelevant Experience Squared
Female
.0003***
.050
R2
.166
.106Mean Square Error
Number of Observations 454 534
* significant at the 10% level (two sided)
**
significant at the 5% level (two sided)
*** significant at the 1% level (two sided)
At Interview
or Separation
.163** (1. 97)
- .003 (.03)
-.087* (1.80)
.095* ( 1. 92)
.0025 ( 1. 09)
.001 (.15)
- .007 (.28)
-.070**(2.09)
.008( 1.02)
.0004 (.15)
- .005 ( 1. 42)
.00079 (.75)
.047(1.10)
.111
.108
A total of 11 additional control variables are not shown in the table. They
were: private vocational school, an interaction of establishment size with
relevant vocational education and 6 indicators for referral source. The
model of profitability in the first 3 months also contains the date of hire
and the date of hire square to control for the effect of inflation on starting
wage rates. The model predicting net benefits at the interview or separation
date contains tenure, tenure squared and tenure less than one year. Prior
to differencing, the experience and tenure less than one year variables are
set equal to 1 if experience or tenure is 1 or greater and set equal to the
experience or tenure variable if it is between 0 and 1. A full set of
estimation results are available by writing to the author.
Disadvantaged
Others
All Workers
Table 2
EMPLOYER EXPECTATION OF PRODUCTIVITY
by
Training and Disadvantaged status
Untrained Trained
$&,000
$7,800
$7,440
$8,000
$9,800
$9,440
